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Abstract 
 
We study a model in which an inventor discloses knowledge about its innovation and 
then a rival chooses the probability of attaining a competing invention. Disclosures, by 
creating prior art, diminish the probability that the rival has of receiving a patent for its 
invention (legal externality), but, by revealing knowledge, they decrease the marginal 
cost of R&D (knowledge externality). We stress the following result. If the knowledge 
externality is large compared to the legal externality, decreasing the patentability 
standards leads to fewer disclosures and may hinder R&D. We also determine the 
impact of changes in market payoffs on the equilibrium level of disclosures and R&D. 
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I. Introduction
The knowledge that rst inventors disclose in patents is usually di¢ cult to protect. Future inventors
may use it to obtain superior non-infringing innovations that may end up undermining the market
position of the original innovator. This is likely the crucial reason for an important majority of real
life patents being obscure and di¢ cult to read despite the formal enablement requirement of patent
law (see, Scotchmer [16]). Similarly, inventors, to avoid disclosure and imitation may use secrecy. In
this manner, they protect their superior market position.1 However, the secretmay be independently
rediscovered by a second research rm. Furthermore, at least in the U.S. if the research rm that
rediscovers the invention obtained a valid patent, it would have the right to exclude the prior inventor
from using the secret innovation.2
In these two disclosure problems, innovators anticipate that disclosure reveals knowledge that
future rivals may potentially use to obtain alternative better products that later might be protected
by patents. Thus, they may be reluctant to disclose because as a result they could be hurt by stronger
rivals in downstream competition. But choosing secrecy undermines one of the main goals of the patent
system: the disclosure of innovative knowledge. However, on the other hand, we point out that rst
inventors also foresee that rivals invest in R&D to obtain their own inventions. Thus, the competitive
threat of future inventions drives innovators to disclose their knowledge to diminish the probability
that a rival may obtain a patent for a related invention. The idea behind this observation is simple:
because future patents are evaluated in the light of the prior art, rst inventors, by disclosing, and
creating new prior art make it more di¢ cult for second inventors to obtain future patent rights on
related innovations.3,4
In this paper, we explore the strategic determination of disclosure when inventors are confronted
with this trade-o¤. We examine the optimal R&D response of a rival to disclosure by an inventor and
the impact of changes in patent policy and market payo¤s on the equilibrium conguration of disclosure
and R&D intensity. Our ideas are organized around the primitive that if the rival is successful in his
R&D and then receives a patent for its invention, the innovator obtains a lower prot than otherwise.
Disclosure plays a dual role: (a) disclosure reveals valuable knowledge that the rival uses in its
R&D activity; and (b) disclosure creates prior art and thus it diminishes the probability that the rival
1Secrecy has gained prominence is several US industries (Cohen, Nelson and Walsh [7], and Lerner [12]) specially
among smaller rms. It is a fact that for these type of rms the costs of detecting misappropriation and enforcing patent
rights are signicant (Lanjouw and Schankermans [11] and Lerner [12]).
2See Denicolo and Franzoni [7] for a discussion of the rst inventor defense.
3Prior art is all the public knowledge either in previous patents, manuscripts, printed publications, etc. that existed
prior to the ling of a patent application. In the United States, when an innovator discloses her invention, a one-year
grace period ensures that the innovators patent right is not immediately extinguished.
4An illustrative example of disclosures in the public domain is that of Plantronics, a telephone headset manufacturer in
Santa Cruz, California. The company developed a new technology for reducing microphone noise. However, the invention
couldnt be used right away. Plantronics posted a description of it on the web site to establish the legal existence of
the idea. Another case is that of The Nutter Machine Company, in Ohio, that has published at least part of one of its
inventions on the web site. See Protecting Intellectual PropertyThe New York Times 02/18/2002, Suddenly, Idea
WarsTake On a New Global Urgency The New York Times 11/11/2002, On the Defensive About Invention The
Financial Times 09/19/2001. It follows from the example that secrecy is not inconsistent with disclosures or publishing.
Innovators may nd attractive to choose a mixture of secrecy and publishing.
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has of receiving a patent right. Concerning this last point, notice that, according to patent law, an
invention can be protected by a patent only if it is a substantial advancement over the prior state of
the art. In reality, however, matters are more complicated and sometimes patents are granted and then
subsequently invalidated in private court disputes. The most frequent ground for invalidity is prior
art and, in many cases, a printed publication accessible to the public is enough to invalidate a patent
(see Allison and Lemley [1]). For the sake of simplicity, we do not make any distinction between the
process of obtaining a patent and the defense from challenges to their validity subsequently made by
competitors.
Within this setup, we address questions like the following ones: (i) Is decreasing the patentability
standards a good policy to encourage disclosure and to boost future R&D activities? (ii) How do
disclosure and R&D intensity depend on the market premium for technological leadership?
Understanding our ndings requires to consider the following two observations. First, we capture
the idea that disclosure reveals valuable knowledge by assuming that it decreases the rivals marginal
cost of achieving any probability of success in its R&D activity. This knowledge externality encourages
R&D. But, by creating prior art, disclosure decreases the probability that the rival has of receiving
a patent. This legal externality, on the contrary, discourages R&D. In this paper, we deal with the
non-trivial case in which the knowledge externality prevails over the legal externality. The resulting
e¤ect is that the rivals best response R&D probability increases with disclosure. We call this net
positive impact of disclosures on R&D the transfer e¤ect. In this case the marginal cost of disclosing
is positive and a higher knowledge externality leads to a higher transfer e¤ect and a higher marginal
cost of disclosing.
Second, the marginal benet of disclosure increases in the level of the R&D probability of the rival.
We call this impact of the R&D probability on disclosure the threat e¤ect. Intuitively, disclosure are
only used to prevent the rival from patenting a competing idea. But to receive a patent, the rival must
rst succeed in its R&D activity. When the level of the R&D probability is higher, success and hence
the threat of the rivals patent is a more likely event. Thus, the marginal value of disclosing rises.
In answering our rst question we nd that a decrease in the standards of patentability is not always
an appropriate policy to promote knowledge dissemination and to foster R&D. Observe the channels
through which a lower patentability standard a¤ects the equilibrium. First, when the patentability
standard decreases the marginal cost of disclosing increases because the rivals patenting probability is
higher for any given disclosure level. However, a lower patentability standard also raises the marginal
because the rivals best response R&D probability shifts upwards and thus, the threat of the rivals
patent becomes a more likely event. This causes an increase in the marginal benet of disclosure.
When the knowledge externality is small compared to the legal externality (in a sense to be made
precise later) the threat e¤ect prevails over the transfer e¤ect and a decrease in the patentability
standards generates a higher level of disclosure and boosts R&D. This is the only case in a lower
patentability standard, overall, has a positive e¤ect on R&D.
However, on the other side of the coin, a decrease in the patentability standards results in a lower
level of disclosures when the knowledge externality is at least twice as large as the legal external e¤ect of
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disclosures. Or equivalently, it generates a strategic withholding of knowledge when the transfer e¤ect
is large. But then the issue of whether or not this policy encourages R&D does not have a clear-cut
answer. For a xed disclosure level, R&D intensity raises as a result of a decrease in the patentability
standard. But a lower patentability standard induces fewer disclosures, increasing the rivals marginal
cost of R&D and thus discouraging R&D. The nal outcome is that when the knowledge externality is
large relative to the legal externality, that is when the social value of disclosure is high, this policy may
hinder R&D. Of course, the strategic withholding of knowledge will damage other economic sectors
and rms which might nd useful the know how related to the invention.
This result contributes to the debate about patentability standards and patent quality. It suggests
in some knowledge-based industries most likely in Software, Semiconductors and biotechnology there
are good reasons to believe that, disclosure, innovation and R&D overall would be well promoted by
increasing the patentability standards. Why? Because in these sectors knowledge disclosure seems to
be crucial for decreasing the future cost of incremental innovations (high knowledge externality) while
the impact of disclosure on the patentability of future patents is really low. This has been documented
in the lowquality of patents that most of the time do not meet the requirement of patentability,
particularly with respect to prior art (which is dispersed in the public domain rather than in prior
patents).
Second and nally, we determine the e¤ects of an exogenous increase in the di¤erence in prots
that a rm obtains when it is the only one which uses the most advanced technology (or innovation)
in the market compared to the case in which both rms use it, i.e., an increase in the market premium
for technological leadership (or simply, market premium). This is an interesting exercise that attempts
to nd a regularity between the amount of secrecy, the intensity of R&D and the size of the premium
for leadership. We show that for those industries in which the knowledge externality is relatively small
or moderate compared to the legal externality, a higher market premium leads to a higher level of
disclosure and R&D intensity. This result contradicts the common view that those industrial sectors
with a high market premium should be characterized by a low level of disclosure and big secrets.
In this case a ourishingenvironment characterized by high-stakes-high-disclosure and high R&D
activityarises. But we also underscore that when the knowledge externality is high enough the picture
might look exactly the opposite: high-stakes-low-disclosure and low R&D activity. In this case, big
secrets may substantially hurt future innovation.
The disclosure problemhas been studied from very di¤erent perspectives. Our paper owes much
to Denicolo and Franzoni [7]. We share with them the view that prior innovators may be hurt by a
subsequent inventor. Their focus, however, is on welfare analysis and they do not consider, as we do,
the possibility of prior art creation. Scotchmer and Green [15] is also related to our work. They focus
on the impact of patent policy on the incentives to both innovate and disclose intermediate discoveries.
The main di¤erence between the papers is that in our model the motivation to disclose is rooted in
the possibility of blocking a rivals patent, an aspect not examined in their paper. This paper is also
related to a literature which explores defensive publications in patent races. Baker, Lichtman and
Mezzetti [4] and Bar [5] construct models in which rms disclose in order to prolong the race, and this
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gives followers a chance to catch up. These papers consider patent races and disclosure is executed by
laggards rather than by leaders (rst inventors) as in the current paper.5 Anton and Yao [2 and 3] and
Johnson [9] have also explored the disclosure problem. Anton and Yao [2 and 3] examined information
disclosure to signal strong capability in an environment of limited IP and asymmetric information .
The analysis of Johnson [9] is close to ours because both papers deal with the same broad issue: the
blocking, by an innovator, of a potential rivals patent. However, the main goal of Johnsons paper
is to identify under which circumstances a defensive publication strategy is preferred by an innovator
to the IP choices of secrecy and patenting. On the contrary, our goal is to examine the problem of
disclosure by an innovator and the R&D incentives of her rival. Finally, although, we do not examine
the choice of IP by the original innovator, it may be easily incorporated along the lines of Ponce [14]
and our results would remain exactly the same.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II sets forth the basics of our model and provides some pre-
liminary results. Section III presents our main ndings. In Section IV some limitations and extensions
to our basic setup are discussed. Section V concludes. All the proofs are provided in the Appendix.
II. The Model and Preliminary Results
Our model contains the following elements. There are two rms, an innovator, referred to as she
and denoted by A, and a rival, referred to as heand denoted by B. We assume that A has obtained
an innovation that may be a new technology that lowers the unit cost of production or an improvement
in the quality of a given commodity. The extensive form of the game is as follows.
(i) A chooses a disclosure level, d, from her disclosure set, D := [0; 1]. Disclosures are technological
knowledge regarding the innovation. They may be executed in a patent or in the public domain, for
example, in a publication. When d = 0, A chooses to keep her innovation entirely hidden and when
d = 1, A makes the best possible description of the innovation. Partial disclosures, d 2 (0; 1), are also
possible.
(ii) After observing d, B chooses a probability of obtaining a related innovation (or simply, the
R&D probability) f 2 [0; 1]. We observe that if B is successful in his R&D, he will try to obtain a
patent to use his innovation. We assume that Bs innovation does not infringe on the previous patent,
if A has chosen to obtain one. Of course, if disclosures are in the public domain this observation is
irrelevant. Thus, the only resolution about property rights that must be made is whether B is granted
a patent or not.
(iii) If B succeeds in his R&D, the Patent O¢ ce decides whether or not to grant a patent to B.
After that decision every residual uncertainty about property rights vanishes. If B receives a patent,
he will exclude A from using the new technology in the market competition game.6
5Parchomovsky [13] was the rst to draw attention to the possibility of strategically creating prior art. Litchman,
Baker and Kraus [12], o¤ered a signalling model of defensive publication.
6We do not make any distinction between the process of awarding patents and the challenges to their validity frequently
made by competitors. However, the assumption that the decision about property rights is concluded before market
competition ts, for instance, a patent reexamination request. This type of procedure deals mainly with issues of
patentability related to prior patents and printed publications.
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(iv) A and B engage in duopolistic competition. The payo¤s the innovator and his rival obtain
in the market competition game depend on the R&D and patenting outcomes. Each possible event
is represented by a pair (RD;P ), with the rst element standing for the result of the R&D and the
second one for the property right resolution. For example, the pair (S; F ) stands for the event in which
R&D is a success for the rival, but he fails to obtain a patent.
For simplicity we posit a symmetric payo¤ structure. If the rival fails in his R&D activity then the
innovator will have the monopoly over the superior technology. In this contingency, prots will be H
for the innovator and L for her rival. On the other side of the coin, if the rival succeeds in obtaining a
superior technology and gets a patent over it, prots will be H for the rival and L for the innovator.
Finally, if the rival succeeds in obtaining a superior technology but he fails in getting a patent, both
rms will obtain M . We assume that payo¤s satisfy the following ordering: H > M > L. This
assumption is satised in many typical models of industrial organization: Cournot with homogeneous
commodities and Bertrand with di¤erentiated product to name just two.
Equilibrium. It is important to notice that although A discloses private knowledge about an
innovation, our game is one of perfect information. Formally, every information set of every player is
a singleton. Thus, the equilibrium concept for our game is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPE).
We concentrate on pure strategy SPE. A strategy for player A is a choice of disclosure, d, from her
disclosure set D and a strategy for B is a real-valued function f : [0; 1]  ! [0; 1].
A. R&D by the Rival
Let C(f; d) denote Bs cost of achieving a probability f , when the disclosure level is d. We assume
that C(f; d) satises the usual conditions:8(f; d) 2 [0; 1] [0; 1] : C(f; d)  0; Cf (f; d)  0; Cff (f; d) >
0. Also: 8d 2 D : C(0; d) = 0; Cf (0; d) = 0. More important:
ASSUMPTION 1: 8(f; d) 2 [0; 1] [0; 1] : Cfd(f; d) < 0.
Assumption 1 says that a higher disclosure level diminishes the marginal cost of duplication. It
implies that Cd(f; d) < 0. The role of this assumption will be clear when we state Lemma 1.
Before continue, it is useful to specify the chance for B of obtaining a patent. This is captured by
Assumption 2. As a preliminary, let (d;
 
s) for any d 2 D denote the probability that B receives a
patent when As disclosure level is d and let
 
s be a measure of the patentability standards. The main
assumption about (:; :) is:7
ASSUMPTION 2: (a) 8d 2 D : (d) 2 (0; 1).
(b) 8d 2 D : d(d) < 0 and dd(d) > 0.
(c) 8d 2 D : @
@
 
s
> 0
The crucial parts are (b) and (c). On the one hand, part (b) holds that disclosure has a marginal
decreasing e¤ect on the probability of securing a valid patent. On the other hand, part (c) says, given
Bs innovation, a bigger
 
s increases Bs probability of receiving a patent, for any given disclosure level
7 In general, derivatives will be denoted by subscripts.
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(i.e., for any level of prior art). Thus, an increase in
 
s can be seen as a decrease in the patentability
standards.
Now we can solve Bs problem. For a given d, B chooses f to maximize his expected payo¤. With
probability 1   f R&D is a failure and Bs prots are L. With probability, f , R&D is a success. In
this case, with probability (d;
 
s), B obtains a patent and gets H and with probability 1  (d; s), a
patent is not granted and he obtains M . Given that B pays C(f; d) whether he succeeds or not, Bs
expected payo¤ is: EUB(f; d; B;
 
s) = L + f
n
(d;
 
s)
 
H   M+  M   Lo C(f; d). To avoid
a corner solution at f = 1, we suppose that at d = 1 : Cf (1; d) >
h
(d;
 
s)
 
H   M+  M   Li.8
Thus, Bs best response is determined by the following necessary and su¢ cient rst order condition:
@EUB(f; d; ;
 
s)
@f
= (d;
 
s)
 
H   M+  M   L  Cf (f; d) = 0 (1)
Observe that, conditional on success in R&D, BV P :=
 
H   M is the di¤erence in prots that
B attains by being successful in obtaining a patent. Thus, we call BV P the value of the patent. Also,
conditional on a failure in obtaining a patent, BV I := 
M   L is the di¤erence in prots that B
obtains by being successful in his R&D. Hence, we call BV I the value of the innovation. In Lemma 1
we prove the existence of Bs best response and characterizes its basic properties.
LEMMA 1: (a) Bs best response exists and it is a C1 function f(d;
 
s; )
(b) Bs best response function f(d;
 
s; ) is such that:
@f(d;
 
s; )
@d
= (Cff )
 1
h
d(d;
 
s)BV P   Cfd (f; d)
i
7 0
and:
@f(d;
 
s; )
@BV P
> 0;
@f(d;
 
s; )
@BV I
> 0;
@f(d;
 
s; )
@
 
s
> 0
PROOF. Part (a) follows from the satisfaction of the conditions for the implicit function theorem:
8(f; d) 2 [0; 1] [0; 1] : Cff (f; d) 6= 0. Part (b) follows from the characterization of comparative static
e¤ects of d;BV P ;
B
V I and
 
s on f using the rst order condition. The specic formulas can be found
in the Appendix. 
Part b) of Lemma 1 has two di¤erent implications. First, it shows that when either BV P or 
B
V I
is higher, B will choose a higher f . Similarly, if patentability standards are decreased, a higher f will
be chosen, for a given disclosure level.
Second, it shows that an increase in d can lead to either a higher or a lower level of f(d;
 
s; ).
This follows from the combination of two opposing external e¤ects: the knowledge externality and the
legal externality. The rst externality is formally captured by Bs lower marginal cost of obtaining any
given f for a higher disclosure level: Cfd (f; d). The second external e¤ect corresponds to Bs lower
8 It follows from the structure of this stage that it is never a best response for B to choose a zero R&D probability.
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marginal expected return because his probability of patenting is smaller when disclosure is higher and
it is analytically dened as: d(d;
 
s)BV P .
If the legal externality is large relative to the knowledge externality, higher disclosure will decrease
Bs best response. Given that, conditional on success, the probability of patenting also decreases with
disclosure, it follows that the equilibrium disclosure strategy is d = 1. For the rest of the paper, we
focus on the case in which the knowledge externality dominates the legal externality and the net e¤ect
of disclosure is to enhance Bs R&D capability. Thus, from now on we suppose that @f(d;
 
s;B)
@d > 0.
9
We call this net positive impact of disclosure on R&D the transfer e¤ect.
B. Disclosure by the Innovator
A chooses a disclosure level d 2 D, anticipating Bs best response function. Thus, we can write As
problem as:
max
(f;d)2K
EUA(f; d) = max
(f;d)2K
h
(1  f)H + fW (d; A; s)
i
(2)
where: W (d; ;
 
s) := (d;
 
s)L + (1  (d; s))M
K : =
n
(f; d) 2 [0; 1] [0; 1] : (d; s)BV P +BV I = Cf (f; d)
o
W (d; ;
 
s) is As expected payo¤ in the state in which B is successful in his R&D. As problem reects
her trade-o¤ when choosing a level of d. By disclosing, the probability of being at the technological
edge,1   f , is reduced. But if B were successful in his R&D, As expected payo¤ would be higher
because @W (d;;
 
s)
@d =  d(d;
 
s)(M   L) > 0.
C. Equilibria: Existence and Uniqueness
Given Lemma 1, it is su¢ cient to focus on As problem to show our elementary existence and
uniqueness result.
PROPOSITION 1: (a) A SPE exists.
(b) If (i) Bs best response, f(d;
 
s; ), is a strictly convex function of disclosure; and (ii).As payo¤
function, EUA(f; d) is quasiconcave, then: a unique SPE exists.
PROOF. See the Appendix
For the rest of the paper, we deal with the case of a unique interior equilibrium. We denote the
equilibrium disclosure strategy by d and by f := f(d; ; s) the equilibrium R&D probability. Let
MB and MC denote the marginal benet and marginal cost of disclosing respectively. In an interior
equilibrium d and fare such that:10
MB :=  d(d;
 
s)f(d; ; s)APR =
@f
@d
(d; ; s)
h
AMP + (d
; s)APR
i
:=MC (3)
9Formally, we assume that
8(f; d) 2 [0; 1] [0; 1] :  Cfd(f; d) >  d(d;
 
s)BV P :
10We derive the marginal benet and cost of disclosing in the Appendix.
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where APR := 
M   L and AMP := H   M . Equation (3) underscores the main motivations that
lead to disclosing and the links between disclosures and R&D intensity. Thus, it is worthy to discuss
it a little bit.
First, notice that, conditional on success in R&D (or simply, the successful state), the term M L
represents the extra prots that A obtains when B fails to obtain a patent compared to the case in
which he succeeds in obtaining one. Thus, M   L captures the additional prots A obtains from
successfully blocking Bs patenting activities. Thus, we call APR := 
M   L the preemption return.
With that interpretation in hand, observe that the marginal benet of disclosing corresponds to
the increase in As expected payo¤ in the successful state due to higher disclosures times the R&D
probability. This observation simply points out that the marginal benet of disclosure increases in the
level of the R&D probability and therefore it implies that any exogenous perturbation that increases
player Bs strategy, f(d; ;
 
s), will also result in an increase of As disclosure strategy. This is what
we call the threat e¤ect.
Second, conditional on a failure in Bs patenting activity, the term H   M represents the extra
prots the innovator obtains when the rival fails in his R&D compared to the case in which he succeeds.
Thus, H   M represents the extra prots A makes due to holding the technological leadership. We
call AMP := 
H   M the market premium for technological leadership (or simply, market premium).
Also, using our denition of APR, As expected payo¤ in the successful state can be expressed as:
W (d; ;
 
s) = M  (d; s)APR. Similarly, when B fails in his R&D, As payo¤ is: H . Thus, we dene
As lost payo¤ due to Bs success in R&D as: (d;
 
s; ) := H  W (d; ; s) = AMP + (d;
 
s)APR.
Hence, using Bs best response function we have that f(d; ;
 
s)
h
AMP + (d;
 
s)APR
i
is As expected
lost payo¤ due to Bs R&D.
Using these intuitions, notice that the marginal cost of disclosing corresponds to the increase in
As expected lost payo¤ due to the higher R&D probability associated with a higher disclosure level.
III. Main Results
A. A Policy Experiment: A decrease in the Patentability Standards
The view of the Patent O¢ ce and courts towards patents and disclosure is determined in our model
by the commonly known parameter
 
s. Our patent decision rule determines that @(d;
 
s)
@
 
s
> 0. In words,
given Bs invention, a higher
 
s increases the probability that B has of receiving a patent for a given
disclosure level (i.e., for a given level of prior art). Thus, an increase in
 
s can be seen as a decrease in
the patentability standards. The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium response of both
disclosures and R&D intensity to an increase in
 
s.
PROPOSITION 2: (a) If and only if  Cfd(f; d) >  2d(d;
 
s)BV P a higher
 
s causes the equilib-
rium level of disclosures d to decrease. The equilibrium level of the R&D probability f(d; ; s) may
either decrease or increase.
(b) If Cfd(f; d)   2d(d;
 
s)BV P a rise in
 
s causes the equilibrium R&D probability f(d; ; s)
to increase.
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PROOF. See the Appendix
Changes in the patentability standards a¤ect disclosure through two di¤erent channels. First, an
increase in
 
s raises the marginal value of disclosures. The reason for this is as follows. A higher
 
s
increases Bs marginal returns of choosing a higher R&D probability. In other words, Bs best response
shifts upward. Thus, by the threat e¤ect, an increase in
 
s raises the marginal benet of disclosing. But,
a decrease in the patentability standards also increases the marginal cost of disclosing by increasing, for
any given disclosure level, Bs patenting probability. The magnitude of the increment in the marginal
cost of disclosing is proportional to the size of transfer e¤ect.
The proposition solves the above trade-o¤s and it generates interesting policy implications. In
particular, it shows that when the knowledge externality is small compared to the legal externality
(i.e., when the inequality of part b) holds) a decrease in the patentability standards generates a higher
level of disclosures and boosts R&D. This is the only situation in which an argument in favor of
implementing this type of policy can be sustained.
However a decrease in the patentability standards results in a lower level of disclosures when the
knowledge externality is at least twice as large as the legal external e¤ect of disclosures. Or equivalently,
this type of policy generates a strategic withholding of knowledge on the part of the innovator when
the transfer e¤ect is large. But then the issue of whether or not an increase in
 
s is a good policy
to encourage R&D does not have a clear-cut answer. Keeping the disclosure level xed, the R&D
probability shifts upward as a result of an increase in
 
s. But a higher
 
s leads to lower disclosure,
increasing Bs marginal cost of R&D and thus decreasing the incentives to R&D. The nal result is
that when the knowledge externality is large relative to the legal externality, that is when the social
value of disclosure is high because of its e¤ects in diminishing the marginal cost of achieving further
innovations, a higher
 
s may hinder R&D.
This result shows that, in most cases, the design of an optimal patent policy should include strict
patentability standards. In this case initial innovators, who are usually the owners of key knowledge for
future incremental innovations, would nd in their own interest to disclose valuable social knowledge
that shall constitute the technological base for future innovations. This policy adviceis even more
appropriate for industries that are knowledge-based like Computers, Software and Semiconductors, for
example.
B. Comparative Statics
Here we study the consequences of exogenous changes on disclosures and R&D. We are interested
in examining the response of disclosures and R&D to changes in the market premium and in the
preemption return. In particular we seek to answer the following two questions:
(a) How does an increase in the market premium for technological leadership a¤ect disclosures and
R&D?
(b) How does an increase in the preemption return a¤ect disclosures and R&D?
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The answer to the rst question is provided in Proposition 3. Our main interest in answering
question (a) lies in understanding the regularities between the incentives to keep the technological
leadership by withholding knowledge by the innovator, and the incentives to invest in R&D by the
rival to achieve that leadership.
Question (b) is answered in Proposition 4. As we said before, the preemption return is the additional
prots A obtains from successfully blockingBs patenting activities. Our main concern here is related to
the situation in which higher duopolistic prots, or equivalently less intense product market competition
when both players use the same innovation, leads to more or less disclosures and R&D.
B1. Changes in the Market Premium
Notice that the market premium and the value of the patent to B are the same, that is AMP =
H M = BV P . The proposition below studies the impact of a higher AMP on disclosures and R&D.
PROPOSITION 3: (a) If and only if  Cfd(f; d) >  2d(d;
 
s)(d; s; ) an increase in AMP
causes the equilibrium level of disclosures d to decrease. The equilibrium level of the R&D probability
f(d; ; s) may either decrease or increase.
(b) If  Cfd(f; d)   2d(d;
 
s)A(d;
 
s; A) an increase in AMP causes the equilibrium level of
the R&D probability f(d; ; s) to increase.
PROOF. See the Appendix
The understanding of this result follows from the next two observations. On the other hand, let us
suppose that the best response probability of the rival f(d; ; s) is kept xed. Then changes in AMP
do not a¤ect the marginal benet of disclosing. The reason is simple: if f(d; ; s) does not change, the
threat e¤ect would be absent and the marginal benet of disclosing does not change. Therefore, keeping
xed f(d; ; s), an increase in AMP raises only the marginal cost of disclosing because it increases
As lost prots when B succeeds in his R&D. This increment in the marginal cost of disclosing is
proportional to the size of the transfer e¤ect. Therefore, ddiminishes. Given that Bs best response
is kept xed and disclosure diminishes, the equilibrium R&D probability would also decrease.
The intuition until now should be clear: if Bs best response did not change, A would disclose less
to increase her probability of being the technological leader and thus to capture the higher prots
associated to that market position.
On the other, however, an increase in AMP corresponds to an increment in 
B
V P and this raises
the marginal benet of disclosing. The argument is simple. When BV P increases, B does optimally
responds by shifting upward his R&D probability for any given disclosure level. Then, by the threat
e¤ect, a higher best response R&D probability raises the marginal benets of disclosing.11 With
11There is a second reinforcing e¤ect that increases disclosure. An increase in BV P decreases the marginal cost of
disclosing by diminishing the extent of the transfer e¤ect (i.e., by leading to a less steep response of the R&D probability
to disclosures). The reason for this second e¤ect is simple. A higher BV P increases the absolute value of the legal
externality that A imposes on B and thus the optimal change in the R&D probability to disclosures diminishes. However
it is of a second order of importance.
10
respect to R&D intensity, a rise in BV P shifts Bs best response upward and this increment in the
R&D probability is strategically reinforced by larger disclosure on the part of A.
Thus overall what determines whether disclosures increases or not are the relative magnitudes of
the threat e¤ect and the transfer e¤ect. Part b) of the proposition conveys the intuitive idea that when
the knowledge externality is not so large, the threat e¤ect dominates the latter and hence an increase
in AMP leads to a higher level of disclosure. The higher level of disclosure plus the exogenously larger
BV P determine a higher equilibrium R&D probability.
This result challenges the common view that when the market premium for leadership is higher A
should disclose less in order to increase her probability of keeping the technological edge. The main
idea behind it is that when the market premium increases B invests so intensively in R&D and hence
the marginal value of disclosing raises a lot! If Bs best response reacts intensely to changes in the
market premium (i.e., to changes in BV P ) then the equilibrium level of disclosure increases.
But, we also observe that if the knowledge externality is su¢ ciently large (i.e., if the condition of
part a) holds) a higher market premium results in strategic withholding of knowledge on the part of
the innovator and this increases the marginal cost of R&D. The nal outcome may be that a higher
market premium causes a lower level of R&D intensity, a result that also seems counterintuitive.
B2. Changes in the Preemption Return
Notice that the preemption return and the value of the innovation for the rival are the same, that
is: APR = 
M   L = BV I . Thus, it is direct to conrm that the following proposition holds.
PROPOSITION 4: An increase in APR causes the equilibrium level of disclosures d
and the R&D
probability f(d; ; s) to rise.
PROOF. See the Appendix
Proposition 4 can easily be understood. On the one hand, an increase in APR increases the extra
prots A obtains by creating new prior art. This increases the marginal benet of disclosing and
therefore encourage disclosure. Also, because an increase in APR coincides with an increase in 
B
V I , it
results that the increment in BV I raises Bs marginal return of doing R&D and thus his best response
shifts upward. Hence, by the threat e¤ect, a higher BV I leads also to a higher marginal benet of
disclosing. These two forces reinforce each other to increase disclosure and the equilibrium R&D
probability.
On the other hand, an increase in APR increases As lost prots when B succeeds in R&D and
thus raises the marginal cost of disclosing. The increment in the marginal cost of disclosing, as shown
by equation (3), is proportional to the size of the transfer e¤ect.
The proposition shows that, at d, the marginal benet of disclosing increases more than the
marginal cost of disclosing, and thus the equilibrium disclosure strategy increases. The equilibrium
R&D probability must also increase. This results conrms that if the duopolistic competition is not
so intense when both players use the same technology disclosure and R&D are higher.
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Main Results: Summary
The table below summarizes our main results. We classify them according to the size of the
knowledge externality. We identify three di¤erent regimes. The Low regime corresponds to the case
in which:  d(d;
 
s)BV P <  Cfd(f; d) <  2d(d;
 
s)BV P . In this case, it can be seen from the
table that a decrease in the patentability standards leads to a higher disclosure and R&D. This is the
only case that clearly supports an argument in favor of implementing this type of policy. A higher
market premium is also associated to a higher level of disclosure and R&D. The Intermediate regime
holds when:  2d(d;
 
s)BV P   Cfd(f; d)   2d(d;
 
s)(d;
 
s; ). In this regime a rise in
 
s
decreases disclosure and might have exactly the opposite intended e¤ect of fostering R&D; while a
higher market premium induces more knowledge disclosure and encourages R&D intensity. Finally,
the High regime holds when:  Cfd(f; d) >  2d(d;
 
s)(d;
 
s; ). For this case, an increase in
 
s has
the same qualitative impact on disclosures and R&D that in the Intermediate regime. However, an
increase in AMP may nally lead to lower levels of R&D.
Low regime Intermediate regime High regime
"  s ) d "; f " d #; f? d #; f?
" AMP =" BV P ) d "; f " d "; f " d #; f?
" APR =" BV I ) d "; f " d "; f " d "; f "
IV. Discussion
Our model is based on a number of simplifying assumptions that prove to be useful to understand
the interactions between disclosures, R&D, patent policy and market payo¤sperturbations. However,
some details of the underlying innovation-disclosure game between the innovator and her rival and
some other features of the patenting environment deserve additional discussion. This section lls that
void.
1. Asymmetric Information: Our innovation-disclosure game is one of complete information. How-
ever, asymmetric information may be introduced into the model by assuming that the innovator might
have private information about the type of innovation that she obtained. Along these lines, suppose
that there are two types of innovations represented by their size(i.e. for example the magnitude of
the cost reduction from the old technology):  2

  ;
 


where 0 <   <
 
 and assume that a bigger
size implies higher prots. The game would become a signaling game and disclosure would play two
di¤erent roles (a) creating prior art and (b) signaling to the rival the prots that he most likely would
obtain in downstream competition.
One reasonable conjecture is that if the rivals random variable , conditional on having being
successful in R&D, is positively correlated with the size  for the innovator, and the threat e¤ect
is not too high, bigger (i.e., more protable) innovations should be less disclosed. The intuition just
comes from the idea that disclosure would help the rival to increase investment in R&D when the rival
realizes that the probability of discovering a protable innovation is high; something that is detrimental
to the innovators prot. However this intuition relies on the assumption that the threat e¤ect is not
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too high; because if it were su¢ ciently large then the marginal value of disclosure would be so high
that a potentially signaling equilibrium with the innovator disclosing more the bigger the size of the
innovation may exist.
2. Subsequent Innovation by the Original Innovator: We have assumed that our innovator does
not attempt to discover the second innovation. This assumption, which is in line with the literature
of sequential innovation, is usually justied by assuming that the rival was the only one who has a
private idea to develop the second innovation. Though extending the model to include a race between
the innovator and the rival would complicate the analysis, our conjecture is that it will not change the
main conclusions.
The model might be extended in the following direction. Both the innovator and the rival would
choose the probability of obtaining the second innovation, fi 2 [0; 1]8i 2 fA;Bg. Now the R&D
cost would be: C(f; d; ); where  2  represents the quality of the idea to develop the second
innovation. Thus if 0 >  =) C(f; d; 0) < C(f; d; ) and 9  2  : 8(f; d); C(f; d;  ) = 1. Thus our
original model would be a particular case in which for the innovator C(f; d;  ) =1. Then a necessary
condition for disclosures to exist is that B   A > 0 and a simple argument can be used to show that
9such that if B   A >  disclosures are positive and zero otherwise. And when B   A decreases
disclosures also diminish.
3. Infringement and Penalties: Our model has abstracted completely from infringement consid-
erations. In fact, our set-up can be interpreted as follows. If B obtains the innovation he can either
obtain a patent or not. In the case he obtains a patent the model presumes that B is automatically not
infringing As innovation. In other words, the model presumes that if Bs innovation has a large enough
inventive step to be patented will automatically escape infringement. However, in reality many inno-
vations are patentable and also infringing (see, Scotchmer [16]), which means that so-called blocking
patents may occur. The way to solve the problem is by means of licensing.
In the case that B does not obtain a patent, the model presumes that his innovation does not
infringe As innovation. In other words, the model assumes that Bs innovation has not a large enough
inventive step to be patented but it will also be not infringing. We also recognize that we do not cover
the case in which Bs innovation is infringing and unpatentable. In this situation, if B were to use
his innovation in the market competition game he would have to pay infringement damages to the
innovator.
In both cases, we conjecture that if the probability of the rival being found infringing As innovation
depends on the amount of knowledge disclosed, the new equilibrium conguration would be character-
ized by higher disclosures. Whether R&D will be higher or not, it is an interesting question that we
do not nd easy to answer without an analytical model incorporating these additional features. These
type of questions are left for future research.
V. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have studied the relationships between disclosure, R&D, IP and market interactions
when disclosure is aimed at creating prior art. Here, we conclude with a brief discussion of our main
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results and potential extensions of our model.
Our results can be used from a policy perspective. We nd that decreasing the patentability stan-
dards is not always a good policy choice. If the disclosure level is kept xed, a lower patentability
standard always increases the intensity of R&D. However, this policy results in strategic withholding of
knowledge on the part of rst inventors when the knowledge externality has an important magnitude.
Thus, a decrease in the patentability standards may nally hinder R&D. In general, our results sug-
gest that in those knowledge based industries, like Software, Computers and Semiconductors, strict
patentability standards may serve better the social goals of promoting disclosure of original innovations
and leading to higher incremental invention.
On the market interactions side, we observe that when the knowledge externality is relatively low, a
higher market premium leads to higher levels of disclosures and R&D intensity. This result contradicts
the common view that those industrial sectors with a high market premium should be characterized by
a low level of disclosure and bigsecrets. In this case a ourishingenvironment characterized by high-
stakes-high-disclosure and high R&D activityarises. But we also underscore that when the knowledge
externality is high enough the picture might look exactly the opposite: high-stakes-low-disclosure and
low R&D activity. In this case, bigsecrets may substantially hurt incremental innovation.
Appendix
PROOF OF LEMMA 1. By part (a), we know that f(d;
 
s; B) := f(:) is a C1 function. Now, using
our denition BV P := 
H   M and di¤erentiating equation (1) with respect to d, we have:
d(d;
 
s)BV P   Cff (f(:); d)
@f(:)
@d
  Cfd (f(:); d) = 0) @f
@d
(:) =
h
d(d;
 
s)BV P   Cfd (f(:); d)
i
Cff (f(:); d)
7 0
Similarly di¤erentiating equation (1) with respect to BV P , 
B
V I := 
M   L and  s we have:
(d;
 
s)  Cff (f(:); d) @f(:)
@BV P
= 0) @f
@BV P
(:) = (Cff (f(:); d))
 1(d; s) > 0
 Cff (f(:); d) @f(:)
@BV I
= 0) @f
@BV I
(:) = (Cff (f(:); d))
 1
@(d;
 
s)
@
 
s
BV P   Cff (f(:); d)
@f(:)
@
 
s
= 0) @f
@
 
s
(:) = (Cff (f(:); d))
 1BV P
@(d;
 
s)
@
 
s
> 0 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.(a) Notice that the constrained set K is non-empty, closed and
bounded. K is non-empty because 8 d 2 D there exists a unique f that solves Bs problem. K is closed
because (d;
 
s) and Cf (f; d) are continuous functions of d and f . And it is bounded because both
f and d 2 [0; 1] and hence K  [0; 1]  [0; 1]. Therefore K is a non-empty compact set. Given that
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EUA(f; d) = [(1   f)H + fW (d; ; s)] : [0; 1]  [0; 1] ! R is a continuous function of d and f , by
Weierstrasss theorem, As problem has a solution.
(b) First by di¤erentiating @f(d;
 
s;B)
@d with respect to d it is easily seen that a su¢ cient condition
for f(d;
 
s; B) to be a strictly convex function of disclosure is to suppose that:
ASSUMPTION A1: 8(f; d) 2 [0; 1] [0; 1] : Cffd(f; d) = 0 and Cfdd(f; d)  0.
This last assumption says, that the rate at which the marginal cost increases is independent of d
and that the rate at which the marginal cost decreases with disclosures is itself a (weakly) decreasing
function of d. The role played by Assumption 3 in characterizing Bs best response is described in the
following lemma.
Then, given Lemma 1, the constrained set can be written as: K := f(d; f) 2 [0; 1]  [0; 1] : f =
f(d;;
 
s)g. By part (a) of the theorem there exists a pair (d0; f0) such that:
EUA((d0; f0)) =MaxfEUA(d; f) : (d; f) 2 Kg
We dene  := EUA((d0; f0)). Assume that there exists a (d1; f1) 2 K such that d1 6= d0 and
 = EUA((d1; f1)). Let  2 (0; 1) and dene  (d0; f0) + (1  ) (d1; f1). Then by quasiconcavity,
EUA(d0+(1 )d1; f0+(1 )f1)  . However, observe that corresponding to d0+(1  )d1, there
is a unique f given by f = f(d0+(1 )d1;; s) such that

d0 + (1  )d1; f(d0 + (1  )d1;; s)

2
K. Then f(d0 + (1  )d1;; s) < f0 + (1  )f1 because by Assumption A1, f(d;; s) is a strictly
convex function of d. Finally, because EUA(f; d) is a monotonically decreasing function of f ,
EUA(d0 + (1  )d1; f(d0 + (1  )d1;; s)) >
EUA(d0 + (1  )d1; f0 + (1  )f1)  
Thus, by contradicting the initial assumption that the pair (d0; f0) is an equilibrium, we have shown
uniqueness. 
First and Second Order Conditions
To prove the rest of the propositions, we solve As problem. We know from Lemma 1 that the
constrained set can be written as:
K :=
n
(d; f) 2 [0; 1] [0; 1] : f = f(d;; s)
o
hence the maximization problem of the innovator is:
max
d2[0;1]
EUA(f(d;;
 
s); d) = max
d2[0;1]
h
(1  f(d;; s))H + f(d;; s)W (d; ; s)
i
where : W (d; ;
 
s) := (d;
 
s)L + (1  (d; s))M
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and the rst order (necessary) condition is:
 @f
@d
(d; ; s)H +
@f
@d
(d; ; s)W (d; ; s) + f(d; ; s)
@W (d; ; s)
@d
= 0
then because @W (d;;
 
s)
@d =  d(d;
 
s)(M   L), we have the following FOC:
 d(d;
 
s)f(d; ; s)(M   L) = @f
@d
(d; ; s)H   @f
@d
(d; ; s)W (d; ; s) () MB =
 d(d;
 
s)f(d; ; s)APR =
@f
@d
(d; ; s)
h
AMP + (d
; s)APR
i
=MC
The second order (local) condition that must be satised at d is:
H :=

@MC
@d
  @MB

@d

> 0
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. Part (a) Using the FOC to di¤erentiateMB andMC with respect
to
 
s, we obtain12
@MB
@
 
s
=  d(d;
 
s)
@f(d; ; s)
@
 
s
APR;
@MC
@
 
s
=
@f
@d
(d; ; s)
@(d; s)
@
 
s
APR
because @
@
 
s

@f
@d (d
; ; s)

= 0. By the Implicit Function Theorem: @d
(; s)
@
 
s
= 1H

@MB
@
 
s
  @MC
@
 
s

.
Hence:
@d(; s)
@
 
s
=
APR
H
 
 d(d;
 
s)
@f(d; ; s)
@
 
s
  @f
@d
(d; ; s)
@(d; s)
@
 
s
!
Using the expressions for @f

@
 
s
and @f

@d from Lemma 1 we obtain:
@d(; s)
@
 
s
=
C 1ff 
A
PR
@(d;
 
s)
@
 
s
H
h
 2d(d;
 
s)BV P + Cfd (f(:); d)
i
Thus:
If  Cfd (f(:); d) >  2d(d;
 
s)BV P ) f   2d(d;
 
s)BV P + Cfd (f(:); d) g < 0 and because
C 1ff 
A
PR
@(d;
 
s )
@
 
s
H > 0, we have that
@d
@
 
s
< 0.
Only if: @d

@
 
s
< 0) f  2d(d;
 
s)BV P + Cfd (f(:); d) g < 0)  Cfd (f(:); d) >  2d(d;
 
s)BV P .
Concerning the R&D probability note: f := f(d(; s); s; ). By the chain rule:
@f
@
 
s
=
@f
@d
(d(; s); s; )
@d(; s)
@
 
s
+
@f(d(; s); s; )
@
 
s
12We assume, just to simplify, that 
d
 
s
(d;
 
s) = 0. All of our results hold no matter the sign of 
d
 
s
(d;
 
s).
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From Lemma 1: @f

@
 
s
> 0. Thus:
If:  Cfd (f(:); d) >  2d(d;
 
s)BV P ) @d
(; s)
@
 
s
< 0, and because @f

@d > 0 ) @f

@d
@d
@
 
s
< 0 =)
@f
@
 
s
7 0.
Only if: @f

@
 
s
7 0 ) @f@d @d

@
 
s
< 0, and because @f

@d > 0 ) @d

@
 
s
< 0 )  Cfd (f(:); d) >
 2d(d;
 
s)BV P . 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3. Recalling that AMP = 
H   M = BV P = MP and using the
FOC to di¤erentiate MB and MC with respect to MP , we obtain:
@MB
@MP
=  @f(d
; ; s)
@BV P
d(d
; s)APR
@MC
@MP
=
@
@BV P

@f
@d
(d; ; s)
h
AMP + (d
; s)APR
i
+
@f
@d
(d; ; s)
Then using the expression for @f

@d from Lemma 1, it is direct to show that:
@
@BV P

@f
@d
(d; ; s)

=
d(d
; s)
Cff (f(:); d)
< 0
because by Assumption A.1: 8(f; d) 2 [0; 1]  [0; 1] : Cffd (f(:); d) = 0. Therefore using the Implicit
Function Theorem:
@d(; s)
@MP
=
1
H
 
 d(d;
 
s)APR
@f(d; ; s)
@BV P
  d(d
; s)
Cff (f(:); d)
A(d;
 
s; A)  @f
@d
(d; ; s)
!
where (d;
 
s; ) = AMP +(d
; s)APR. Using the expressions of
@f
@BV P
and @f

@d from Lemma 1 in this
last expression, we obtain:
@d(; s)
@MP
=
8<: d(d
; s)APR(d
; s)  d(d;
 
s)(d; s; ) 
h
d(d
; s)BV P   Cfd (f(:); d)
i
CffH
9=;
Part (a) If. For clarity reasons, we prove it in steps.
Step 1:If  Cfd >  2d(:) ) 0 > Cfd   d(AMP + (d;
 
s)APR)   d(d;
 
s)(:), because (:) =
AMP + (d
; s)APR. Thus:
Step 2: 0 > Cfd   d(AMP + APR)  d(:) =  

d
A
MP   Cfd
  dAPR   d(:)
) @d(;
 
s)
@AMP
< 0.
Only if:
Step 1: @d

@AMP
< 0) Cfd   d(AMP + (d;
 
s)APR +(:)) < 0)
Step 2: Cfd (f; d) >  d(AMP + APR +(:)). But (:) = AMP + (d;
 
s)APR. Thus:
Step 3: @d

@AMP
< 0)  Cfd >  2d(:).
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With respect to the R&D: f := f(d(; s); s; ). By the chain rule:
@f
@MP
=
@f
@d
(d(; s); s; )
@d(; s)
@MP
+
@f(d(; s); s; )
@MP
From Lemma 1: @f

@MP
= @f

@BV P
> 0. Thus:
Step 1:(If)  Cfd >  2d(:) by part a) @d

@MP
< 0 and because @f

@d > 0 ) @f

@d
@d(; s)
@MP
< 0 =)
@f
@MP
7 0.
Only if: @f

@MP
7 0 ) @f@d @d
(; s)
@MP
< 0 and because @f

@d > 0 ) @d

@MP
< 0 )  Cfd (:) >
 2d(:)(:).
Part (b). Again f := f(d(; s); s; ). By the chain rule:
@f
@MP
=
@f
@d
(d(; s); s; )
@d(; s)
@MP
+
@f(d(; s); s; )
@MP
From Lemma 1: @f

@MP
= @f

@V P
> 0. Thus If:  Cfd >  2d(:) ) @d

@MP
 0 and because
@f
@d > 0) @f

@d
@d
@MP
 0. Thus, @f@MP > 0.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4. Recalling that APR = 
M   L = BV I = PR and using the FOC
to di¤erentiate MB and MC with respect to PR, we obtain:
@MB
@PR
=  d(d;
 
s)f(d; ; s)  d(d;
 
s)
@f(d; ; s)
@APR
APR;
@MC
@PR
=
@
@BV I

@f
@d
(d; ; s)

(d; s; ) +
@f
@d
(d; ; s)(d; s)
Using the expression for @f

@d that follows from Lemma 1 we have that:
@
@BV I

@f
@d
(d; ; s)

= 0
Hence using the Implicit Function Theorem:
@d(; s)
@PR
=
1
H
"
 d(d;
 
s)f(d; ; s)  d(d;
 
s)
@f(d; ; s)
@APR
APR  
@f
@d
(d; ; s)(d; s)
#
From the FOC it follows that:
 d(d;
 
s)f(d; ; s) =
@f
@d
(d; ; s)

AMP
APR
+ (d; s)

Therefore:
@d(; s)
@PR
=
1
H
"
@f
@d
(d; ; s)
AMP
APR
  d(d;
 
s)
@f(d; ; s)
@APR
APR
#
> 0
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because by Lemma 1 @f

@PR
= @f

@BV I
> 0.
With respect to the R&D probability: f := f(d(; s); s; ). By the chain rule:
@f
@PR
=
@f
@d
(d(; s); s; )
@d(; s)
@PR
+
@f(d(; s); s; )
@PR
From Lemma 1: @f

@PR
= @f

@BV I
> 0 and because@f

@d > 0) @f

@d
@d
@PR
> 0 =) @f@PR > 0. 
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